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ABSTRACT
This paper presents Merlin, a new framework for managing
resources in software-defined networks. With Merlin, ad-
ministrators express high-level policies using programs in a
declarative language. The language includes logical predi-
cates to identify sets of packets, regular expressions to en-
code forwarding paths, and arithmetic formulas to specify
bandwidth constraints. The Merlin compiler uses a combi-
nation of advanced techniques to translate these policies into
code that can be executed on network elements including a
constraint solver that allocates bandwidth using parameter-
izable heuristics. To facilitate dynamic adaptation, Merlin
provides mechanisms for delegating control of sub-policies
and for verifying that modifications made to sub-policies
do not violate global constraints. Experiments demonstrate
the expressiveness and scalability of Merlin on real-world
topologies and applications. Overall, Merlin simplifies net-
work administration by providing high-level abstractions for
specifying network policies and scalable infrastructure for
enforcing them.
1. INTRODUCTION
Network operators today must deal with a wide range of
management challenges from increasingly complex policies
to a proliferation of heterogeneous devices to ever-growing
traffic demands. Software-defined networking (SDN) pro-
vides tools that could be used to address these challenges,
but existing SDN APIs are either too low-level or too limited
in functionality to enable effective implementation of rich
network-wide policies. As a result, there is widespread in-
terest in academia and industry in higher-level programming
languages and “northbound APIs” that provide convenient
control over the complete set of resources in a network.
Unfortunately, despite several notable advances, there is
still a large gap between the capabilities of existing SDN
APIs and the realities of network management. Current pro-
gramming languages focus mostly on packet forwarding and
largely ignore functionality such as bandwidth and richer
packet-processing functions that can only be implemented
on middleboxes, end hosts, or with custom hardware [19,
47, 64, 2, 50]. Network orchestration frameworks provide
powerful mechanisms that handle a larger set of concerns
including middlebox placement and bandwidth [22, 34, 54,
57], but they expose APIs that are either extremely simple
(e.g., sequences of middleboxes) or not specified in detail.
Overall, the challenges of managing real-world networks us-
ing existing SDN APIs remain unmet.
This paper presents a new SDN programming language
that is designed to fill this gap. This language, called Merlin,
provides a collection of high-level programming constructs
for (i) classifying packets; (ii) controlling forwarding paths;
(iii) specifying rich packet transformations; and (iv) provi-
sioning bandwidth in terms of maximum limits and mini-
mum guarantees. These features go far beyond what can be
realized just using SDN switches or with existing languages
like Frenetic [19], Pyretic [46], and Maple [64]. As a re-
sult, implementing Merlin is non-trivial because it involves
determining allocations of limited network-wide resources
such as bandwidth—the simple compositional translations
used in existing SDN compilers cannot be readily extended
to handle the new features provided in Merlin.
Merlin uses a variety of compilation techniques to deter-
mine forwarding paths, map packet transformations to net-
work elements, and allocate bandwidth. These techniques
are based on a unified representation of the physical net-
work topology and the constraints expressed by the policy—
a logical topology. For traffic with bandwidth guarantees,
the compiler uses a mixed integer program formulation to
solve a variant of the multi-commodity flow constraint prob-
lem. For traffic without bandwidth guarantees, Merlin lever-
ages properties of regular expressions and finite automata
to efficiently generate forwarding trees that respect the path
constraints encoded in the logical topology. Handling these
two kinds of traffic separately allows Merlin to provide a
uniform interface to programmers while reducing the size of
the more expensive constraint problems that must be solved.
The compiler also handles generation of low-level instruc-
tions for a variety of elements including switches, middle-
boxes, and end hosts.
Although the configurations emitted by the Merlin com-
piler are static, the system also incorporates mechanisms for
handling dynamically changing policies. Run-time compo-
nents called negotiators communicate among themselves to
dynamically adjust bandwidth allocations and verify that the
1
ar
X
iv
:1
40
7.
11
99
v1
  [
cs
.N
I] 
 4 
Ju
l 2
01
4
loc ∈ Locations
t ∈ Packet transformations
pol ::= [s1; . . . ; sn], φ Policies
s ::= id : p→ r Statements
φ ::= max(e, n) | min(e, n) Presburger Formulas
| φ1 and φ2 | φ1 or v2 | ! φ1
e ::= n | id | e+ e Bandwidth Terms
a ::= . | c | a a | a|a | a∗ | ! a Path Expression
p ::= m | p1 and p2 | p1 or p2 | ! p1 Predicates
| h.f = n | true | false
c ::= loc | t Path Element
Figure 1: Merlin abstract syntax.
modifications made by other negotiators do not lead to pol-
icy violations. Again, the use of a high-level programming
language is essential, as it provides a concrete basis for ana-
lyzing, transforming, and verifying policies.
We have built a working prototype of Merlin, and used
it to implement a variety of practical policies that demon-
strate the expressiveness of the language. These examples
illustrate how Merlin supports a wide range of network func-
tionality including simple forwarding policies, policies that
require rich transformations usually implemented on mid-
dleboxes such as load balancing and deep-packet inspection,
and policies that provide bandwidth guarantees. We have
also implemented negotiators that realize max-min fair shar-
ing and additive-increase multiplicative-decrease dynamic
allocation schemes. Our experimental evaluation shows that
the Merlin compiler can quickly provision and configure real-
world datacenter and enterprise networks, and that Merlin
can be used to obtain better application performance for data
analytics and replication systems.
Overall, this paper makes the following contributions:
• The design of high-level network management abstrac-
tions realized in an expressive policy language that mod-
els packet classification, forwarding, transformation,
and bandwidth.
• Compilation algorithms based on a translation from
policies to constraint problems that can be solved using
mixed integer programming.
• An approach for dynamically adapting policies using
negotiators and accompanying verification techniques,
made possible by the language design.
The rest of this paper describes the design of the Merlin lan-
guage (§2), compiler (§3), and runtime transformations (§4).
It then describes the implementation (§5) and presents the
results from our performance evaluation (§6).
2. LANGUAGE DESIGN
The Merlin policy language is designed to give program-
mers a rich collection of constructs that allow them to spec-
ify the intended behavior of the network at a high level of
abstraction. As an example, suppose that we want to place
a bandwidth cap on FTP control and data transfer traffic,
while providing a bandwidth guarantee to HTTP traffic. The
program below realizes this specification using a sequence
of Merlin policy statements, followed by a logical formula.
Each statement contains a variable that tracks the amount of
bandwidth used by packets processed with that statement, a
predicate on packet headers that identifies a set of packets,
and a regular expression that describes a set of forwarding
paths through the network:
[ x : (eth.src = 00:00:00:00:00:01 and
eth.dst = 00:00:00:00:00:02 and
tcp.dst = 20) -> .* dpi .*
y : (eth.src = 00:00:00:00:00:01 and
eth.dst = 00:00:00:00:00:02 and
tcp.dst = 21) -> .*
z : (eth.src = 00:00:00:00:00:01 and
eth.dst = 00:00:00:00:00:02 and
tcp.dst = 80) -> .* dpi *. nat .* ],
max(x + y,50MB/s) and min(z,100MB/s)
The statement on the first line asserts that FTP traffic from
the host with MAC address 00:00:00:00:00:01 to the host
with MAC address 00:00:00:00:00:02 must travel along a
path that includes a packet processing function that performs
deep-packet inspection (dpi). The next two statements iden-
tify and constrain FTP control and HTTP traffic between the
same hosts respectively. Note that the statement for FTP con-
trol traffic does not include any constraints on its forwarding
path, while the HTTP statement includes both a dpi and a nat
constraint. The formula on the last line declares a bandwidth
cap (max) on the FTP traffic, and a bandwidth guarantee (min)
for the HTTP traffic. The rest of this section describes the
constructs used in this policy in detail.
2.1 Syntax and semantics
The syntax of the Merlin policy language is defined by
the grammar in Figure 1. A policy is a set of statements,
each of which specifies the handling of a subset of traffic,
together with a logical formula that expresses a global band-
width constraint. For simplicity, we require that the state-
ments have disjoint predicates and together match all pack-
ets. In our implementation, these requirements are enforced
by a simple pre-processor. Each policy statement comprises
several components: an identifier, a logical predicate, and a
regular expression. The identifier provides a way to identify
the set of packets matching the predicate, while the regular
expression specifies the forwarding paths and packet trans-
formations that should be applied to matching packets. To-
gether, these abstractions facilitate thinking of the network
as a “big switch” [35], while enabling programmers to retain
precise control over forwarding paths and bandwidth usage.
Logical predicates. Merlin supports a rich predicate lan-
guage for classifying packets. Atomic predicates of the form
h.f = n denote the set of packets whose header field h.f
is equal to n. For instance, in the example policy above,
statement z contains the predicate that matches packets with
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eth source address 00:00:00:00:00:01, destination address
00:00:00:00:00:02, and tcp port 80. Merlin provides atomic
predicates for a number of standard protocols including Eth-
ernet, IP, TCP, and UDP, and a special predicate for match-
ing packet payloads. Predicates can also be combined using
conjunction (and), disjunction (or), and negation (!).
Regular expressions. Merlin allows programmers to spec-
ify the set of allowed forwarding paths through the network
using regular expressions—a natural and well-studied math-
ematical formalism for describing paths through a graph (such
as a finite state automaton or a network topology). However,
rather than matching strings of characters, as with ordinary
regular expressions, Merlin regular expressions match se-
quences of network locations (including names of transfor-
mations, as described below). The compiler is free to select
any matching path for forwarding traffic as long as the other
constraints expressed by the policy are satisfied. We assume
that the set of network locations is finite. As with POSIX
regular expressions, the dot symbol (.) matches a single el-
ement of the set of all locations.
Packet transformations. Merlin regular expressions may
also contain names of packet-processing functions that may
transform the headers and contents of packets. Such func-
tions can be used to implement a variety of useful operations
including deep packet inspection, network address transla-
tion, wide-area optimizers, caches, proxies, traffic shapers,
and others. The compiler determines the location where each
function is enforced, using a mapping from function names
to possible locations supplied as a parameter. The only re-
quirements on these functions are that they must take a single
packet as input and generate zero or more packets as output,
and they must only access local state. In particular, the re-
striction to local state allows the compiler to freely place
functions without having to worry about maintaining global
state. Merlin’s notion of packet processing functions that
can be easily moved within the network is similar in spirit to
network function virtualization [9].
Bandwidth constraints. Merlin policies use formulas in
Presburger arithmetic (i.e, first-order formulas with addition
but without multiplication, to ensure decidability) to specify
constraints that either limit (max) or guarantee (min) band-
width. The addition operator can be used to specify an ag-
gregate cap on traffic, such as in the max(x + y, 50MB/s)
term from the running example. By convention, policies
without a rate clause are unconstrained—policies that lack
a minimum rate are not guaranteed any bandwidth, and poli-
cies that lack a maximum rate may send traffic at rates up
to line speed. Bandwidth limits and guarantees differ from
packet processing functions in one important aspect: they
represent an explicit allocation of global network resources.
Hence, additional care is needed when compiling them.
Syntactic sugar. In addition to the core constructs shown
in Figure 1, Merlin also supports several forms of syntactic
sugar that can simplify the expression of complex policies.
Notably, Merlin provides set literals and functions for oper-
ating on and iterating over sets. For example, the following
policy,
srcs := {00:00:00:00:00:01}
dsts := {00:00:00:00:00:02}
foreach (s,d) in cross(srcs,dsts):
tcp.dst = 80 ->
( .* nat .* dpi .*) at max(100MB/s)
is equivalent to statement z from the example. The sets srcs
and dsts refer to singleton sets of hosts. The cross operator
takes the cross product of these sets. The foreach statement
iterates over the resulting set, creating a predicate from the
src s, destination d, and term tcp.dst = 80.
Summary. Overall, Merlin’s policy language enables di-
rect expression of high-level network policies. Crucial to
its design, however, is that policies can be distilled into their
component constructs, which can then be distributed across
many devices in the network to collectively enforce the global
policy. The subsequent sections present these distribution
and enforcement mechanisms in detail.
3. COMPILER
The Merlin compiler performs three essential tasks: (i)
it translates global policies into locally-enforceable policies;
(ii) it determines the paths used to carry traffic across the
network, places packet transformations on middleboxes and
end hosts, and allocates bandwidth to individual flows; and
(iii) it generates low-level instructions for network devices
and end hosts. To do this, the compiler takes as inputs the
Merlin policy, a representation of the physical topology, and
a mapping from transformations to possible placements, and
builds a logical topology that incorporates the structure of
the physical topology as well as the constraints encoded in
the policy. It then analyzes the logical topology to determine
allocations of resources and emits low-level configurations
for switches, middleboxes, and end hosts.
3.1 Localization
Merlin’s Presburger arithmetic formulas are an expressive
way to declare bandwidth constraints, but actually imple-
menting them leads to several challenges: aggregate guaran-
tees can be enforced using shared quality-of-service queues
on switches, but aggregate bandwidth limits are more diffi-
cult, since they require distributed state in general. To solve
this problem, Merlin adopts a pragmatic approach. The com-
piler first rewrites the formula so that the bandwidth con-
straints apply to packets at a single location. Given a for-
mula with one term over n identifiers, the compiler pro-
duces a new formula of n local terms that collectively im-
ply the original. By default, the compiler divides bandwidth
equally among the local terms, although other schemes are
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Figure 2: Logical topology for the example policy. The
thick, red path illustrates a solution.
permissible. For example, the max term in the running ex-
ample would be localized to max(x, 25MB/s) and max(y,
25MB/s). Rewriting policies in this way involves an inher-
ent tradeoff: localized enforcement increases scalability, but
risks underutilizing resources if the static allocations do not
reflect actual usage. In Section 4, we describe how Merlin
navigates this tradeoff via a run-time mechanism, called ne-
gotiators, that can dynamically adjust allocations.
3.2 Provisioning for Guaranteed Rates
The most challenging aspect of the Merlin compilation
process is provisioning bandwidth for traffic with guaran-
tees. To do this, the compiler encodes the input policy and
the network topology into a constraint problem whose solu-
tion, if it exists, can be used to determine the configuration
of each network device.
Logical topology. Recall that a statement in the Merlin
language contains a regular expression, which constrains the
set of forwarding paths and packet processing functions that
may be used to satisfy the statement. To facilitate the search
for routing paths that satisfy these constraints, the compiler
represents them internally as a directed graph G whose paths
correspond to physical network paths that respect the path
constraints of a single statement. The overall graph G for
the policy is a union of disjoint components Gi, one for each
statement i.
The regular expression ai in statement i is over the set
of locations and packet processing functions. The first step
in the construction of Gi is to map ai into a regular expres-
sion a¯i over the set of locations using a simple substition:
for every occurrence of a packet transformation, we substi-
tute the union of all locations associated with that function.
(Recall that the compiler takes an auxiliary input specify-
ing this mapping from functions to locations.) For example,
if h1, h2, and m1 are the three locations capable of running
network address translation, then the regular expression .*
nat .* would be transformed to .* (h1|h2|m1) .*. The
next step is to transform the regular expression a¯i into a non-
deterministic finite automaton (NFA), denoted Mi, that ac-
cepts the set of strings in the regular language given by a¯i.
Letting L denote the set of locations in the physical net-
work and Qi denote the state set of Mi, the vertex set of
Gi is the Cartesian product L × Qi together with two spe-
cial vertices {si, ti} that serve as a universal source and sink
for paths representing statement i respectively. The graph Gi
has an edge from (u, q) to (v, q′) if and only if: (i) u = v or
(u, v) is an edge of the physical network, and (ii) (q, q′) is
a valid state transition ofMi when processing v. Likewise,
there is an edge from si to (v, q′) if and only if (q0, q′) is
a valid state transition ofMi when processing v, where q0
denotes the start state ofMi. Finally, there is an edge from
(u, q) to ti if and only if q is an accepting state ofMi. Paths
in Gi correspond to paths in the physical network that satisfy
the path constraints of statement i:
LEMMA 1. A sequence of locations u1, u2, . . . , uk satis-
fies the constraint described by regular expression a¯i if and
only if Gi contains a path of the form
si, (u1, q1), (u2, q2), . . . , (uk, qk), ti for some state sequence
q1, . . . , qk.
PROOF. The construction of Gi ensures that
si, (u1, q1), (u2, q2), . . . , (uk, qk), ti is a path if and only if
(i) the sequence u1, . . . , uk represents a path in the physical
network (possibly with vertices of the path repeated more
than once consecutively in the sequence), and (ii) the au-
tomatonMi has an accepting computation path for u1, . . . , uk
with state sequence q0, q1, . . . , qk. The lemma follows from
the fact that a string belongs to the regular language defined
by a¯i if and only ifMi has a computation path that accepts
that string.
Figure 2 illustrates the construction of the graph Gi for
a statement with path expression h1 .* dpi .* nat .* h2,
on a small example network. We assume that deep packet
inspection (dpi) can be performed at h1, h2, or m1, whereas
network address translation (nat) can only be performed at
m1. Paths matching the regular expression can be “lifted” to
paths in Gi; the thick, red path in the figure illustrates one
such lifting. Notice that the physical network also contains
other paths such as h1, s1, h2 that do not match the regu-
lar expression. These paths do not lift to any path in Gi.
For instance, focusing attention on the rows of nodes cor-
responding to states q2 and q3 of the NFA, one sees that all
edges between these two rows lead into node (m1,q3). This,
in turn, means that any path that avoids m1 in the physical
network cannot be lifted to an si-ti path in the graph Gi.
Path selection. Next, the compiler determines a satisfying
assignment of paths that respect the bandwidth constraints
encoded in the policy. The problem bears a similarity to
the well-known multi-commodity flow problem [1], with two
additional types of constraints: (i) integrality constraints de-
mand that only one path may be selected for each statement,
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Figure 3: Path selection heuristics.
and (ii) path constraints are specified by regular expressions,
as discussed above. To incorporate path constraints, we for-
mulate the problem in the graph G = ⋃i Gi described above,
rather than in the physical network itself. Incorporating inte-
grality constraints into multi-commodity flow problems ren-
ders them NP-complete in the worst case, but a number of ap-
proaches have been developed over the years for surmount-
ing this problem, ranging from approximation algorithms [8,
11, 15, 37, 39], to specialized algorithms for topologies such
as expanders [6, 21, 36] and planar graphs [51], to the use
of mixed-integer programming [5]. Our current implemen-
tation adopts the latter technique.
Our mixed-integer program (MIP) has one {0, 1}-valued
decision variable xe for each edge e of G; selecting a route
for each statement corresponds to selecting a path from si to
ti for each i and setting xe = 1 on the edges of those paths,
xe = 0 on all other edges of G. These variables are required
to satisfy the flow conservation equations
∀v ∈ G
∑
e∈δ+(v)
xe −
∑
e∈δ−(v)
xe =

1 if v = si
−1 if v = ti
0 otherwise
(1)
where δ+(v), δ−(v) denote the sets of edges exiting and en-
tering v, respectively. For bookkeeping purposes the MIP
also has real-valued variables ruv for each physical network
link (u, v), representing what fraction of the link’s capac-
ity is reserved for statements whose assigned path traverses
(u, v). Finally, there are variables rmax and Rmax repre-
senting the maximum fraction of any link’s capacity devoted
to reserved bandwidth, and the maximum net amount of re-
served bandwidth on any link, respectively. The equations
and inequalities pertaining to these additional variables can
be written as follows. For any statement i, let rimin denote
the minimum amount of bandwidth guaranteed in the rate
clause of statement i. (rimin = 0 if the statement contains
no bandwidth guarantee.) For any physical link (u, v), let
cuv denote its capacity and let Ei(u, v) denote the set of all
edges of the form ((u, q), (v, q′)) or ((v, q), (u, q′)) in Gi.
∀(u, v) ruvcuv =
∑
i
∑
e∈Ei(u,v)
riminxe (2)
∀(u, v) rmax ≥ ruv (3)
∀(u, v) Rmax ≥ ruvcuv (4)
rmax ≤ 1 (5)
Constraint 2 defines ruv to be the fraction of capacity on
link (u, v) reserved for bandwidth guarantees. Constraints 3
and 4 ensure that rmax (respectively, Rmax) is at least the
maximum fraction of capacity reserved on any link (respec-
tively, the maximum net amount of bandwidth reserved on
any link). Constraint 5 ensures that the route assignment
will not exceed the capacity of any link, by asserting that the
fraction of capacity reserved on any link cannot exceed 1.
Path selection heuristics. In general, there may be mul-
tiple assignments that satisfy the path and bandwidth con-
straints. To indicate the preferred assignment, programmers
can invoke Merlin with one of three optimization criteria:
• Weighted shortest path: minimizes the total number of
hops in assigned paths, weighted by bandwidth guar-
antees: min
∑
i
∑
u6=v
∑
e∈Ei(u,v) r
i
minxe. This crite-
rion is appropriate when the goal is to minimize latency
as longer paths tend to experience increased latency.
• Min-max ratio: minimizes the maximum fraction of
capacity reserved on any link (i.e., rmax). This cri-
terion is appropriate when the goal is to balance load
across the network links.
• Min-max reserved: minimizes the maximum amount
of bandwidth reserved on any link (i.e., Rmax). This
criterion is appropriate when the goal is to guard against
failures, since it limits the maximum amount of traffic
that may disrupted by a single link failure.
The differences between these heuristics are illustrated in
Figure 3 which depicts a simple network with hosts h1 and
h2 connected by a pair of disjoint paths. The left path com-
prises three edges of capacity 400MB/s. The right path com-
prises two edges of capacity 100MB/s. The figure shows the
paths selected for two statements each requesting a band-
width guarantee of 50MB/s. Depending on the heuristic, the
MIP solver will either select two-hop paths (weighted short-
est path), reserve no more than 25% of capacity on any link
(min-max ratio), or reserve no more than 50MB/s on any
link (min-max reserved).
3.3 Provisioning for Best-Effort Rates
For traffic requiring only best-effort rates, Merlin does
not need to solve a constraint problem. Instead, the com-
piler only needs to compute sink-trees that obey the path
constraints expressed in the policy. A sink-tree for a par-
ticular network node forwards traffic from elsewhere on the
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network to that node. Merlin does this by computing the
cross product of the regular expression NFA and the network
topology representation, as just described, and then perform-
ing a breath-first search over the resulting graph. To further
improve scalability, the compiler uses a small optimization:
it works on a topology that only includes switches, and com-
putes a sink tree for each egress switch. The compiler adds
instructions to forward traffic from the egress switches to
the hosts during code generation. This allows the BFS to be
computed inO(|V ||E|), where |V | is the number of switches
rather than the number of hosts.
3.4 Code Generation
Next, the Merlin compiler generates code to enforce the
policy using the devices available in the network. The actual
code is determined both by the requested functionality and
the type of target device. For basic forwarding and band-
width guarantees, Merlin generates instructions for Open-
Flow switches and controllers [45] that install forwarding
rules and configure port queues. For packet transformations
such as deep packet inspection, network address translation,
and intrusion detection, Merlin generates scripts to install
and configure middleboxes, such as Click [38]. Traffic fil-
tering and rate limiting are implemented by generating calls
to the standard Linux utilities iptables. Of course, other
approaches are possible. For example, Merlin could imple-
ment packet transformations by using Puppet [53] to provi-
sion virtual machines that implement those transformations.
Because Merlin controls forwarding paths but also sup-
ports middleboxes that may modify headers (such as NAT
boxes), the compiler needs to use a forwarding mechanism
that is robust to changes in packet headers. Our current im-
plementation uses VLAN tags to encode paths to destination
switches, one tag per sink tree. All packets destined for that
tree’s sink are tagged with a tag when they enter the network.
Subsequent switches simply examine the tag to determine
the next hop. At the egress switch, the tag is stripped off
and a unique host identifier (e.g., the MAC address) is used
to forward traffic to the appropriate host. This approach is
similar to the technique used in FlowTags [17].
Merlin can provide greater flexibility and expressiveness
by directly generating packet-processing code, which can be
executed by an interpreter running on end hosts or on mid-
dleboxes. We have also built a prototype that runs as a Linux
kernel module and uses the netfilter callback functions to
access packets on the network stack. The interpreter accepts
and enforces programs that can filter or rate limit traffic us-
ing a richer set of predicates than those offered by iptables.
It is designed to have minimal dependencies on operating
system services in order to make it portable across different
systems. The current implementation requires only about a
dozen system calls to be exported from the operating sys-
tem to the interpreter. In on-going work, we are exploring
additional functionality, with the goal or providing a gen-
eral runtime as the target for the Merlin complier. However,
using end hosts assumes a trusted deployment in which all
host machines are under administrative control. An inter-
esting, but orthogonal, problem is to deploy Merlin in an un-
trusted environment. Several techniques have been proposed
to verify that an untrusted machine is running certain soft-
ware. Notable examples include proof carrying code [49],
and TPM-based attestations [16, 60].
Merlin can be instantiated with a variety of backends to
capitalize on the capabilities of the available devices in the
network. Although the expressiveness of policies is bounded
by the capabilities of the devices, Merlin provides a unified
interface for programming them.
4. DYNAMIC ADAPTATION
The Merlin compiler described in the preceding section
translates policies into static configurations. Of course, these
static configurations may under-utilize resources, depending
on how traffic demands evolve over time. Moreover, in a
shared environment, network tenants may wish to customize
global policies to suit their own needs—e.g., to add addi-
tional security constraints.
To allow for the dynamic modification of policies, Mer-
lin uses small run-time components called negotiators. Ne-
gotiators are policy transformers and verifiers—they allow
policies to be delegated to tenants for modification and they
provide a mechanism for verifying that modifications made
by tenants do not lead to violations of the original global
policy. Negotiators depend critically on Merlin’s language-
based approach. The same abstractions that allow policies
to be mapped to constraint problems (i.e., predicates, regu-
lar expressions, and explicit bandwidth reservations), make
it easy to support verifiable policy transformations.
Negotiators are distributed throughout the network in a
tree, forming a hierarchical overlay over network elements.
Each negotiator is responsible for the network elements in
the subtree for which it is the root. Parent negotiators im-
pose policies on their children. Children may refine their
own policies, as long as the refinement implies the parent
policy. Likewise, siblings may renegotiate resource assign-
ments cooperatively, as long as they do not violate parent
policies. Negotiators communicate amongst themselves to
dynamically adjust bandwidth allocations to fit particular de-
ployments and traffic demands.
4.1 Transformations
With negotiators, tenants can transform global network
policies by refining the delegated policies to suit their own
demands. Tenants may modify policies in three ways: (i)
policies may be refined with respect to packet classification;
(ii) forwarding paths may be further constrained; and (iii)
bandwidth allocations may be revised.
Refining policies. Merlin policies classify packets into sets
using predicates that combine matches on header fields using
logical operators. These sets can be refined by introducing
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additional constraints to the original predicate. For example,
a predicate for matching all TCP traffic:
ip.proto = tcp
can be partitioned into ones that match HTTP traffic and all
other traffic:
ip.proto = tcp and tcp.dst = 80
ip.proto = tcp and tcp.dst != 80
The partitioning must be total—all packets identified by the
original policy must be identified by the set of new policies.
Constraining paths. Merlin programmers declare path con-
straints using regular expressions that match sequences of
network locations or packet transformations. Tenants can
refine a policy by adding addition constraints to the regular
expression. For example, an expression that says all packets
must go through a traffic logger (LOG) function:
.* log .*
can be modified to say that the traffic must additionally pass
through a DPI function:
.* log .* dpi .*
Re-allocating bandwidth. Merlin’s limits (max) and guar-
antees (min) constrain allocations of network bandwidth. Af-
ter a policy has been refined, these constraints can be redis-
tributed to improve utilization. The requirement for a valid
transformation is that the sum of the new allocations must
not exceed the original allocation.
Example. As an example that illustrates the use of all three
transformations, consider the following policy, which caps
all traffic between two hosts at 100MB/s:
[x : (ip.src = 192.168.1.1 and
ip.dst = 192.168.1.2) -> .*],
max(x, 100MB/s)
This policy could be modified as follows:
[x : (ip.src = 192.168.1.1 and
ip.dst = 192.168.1.2 and
tcp.dst = 80) -> .* log .*],
[y : (ip.src = 192.168.1.1 and
ip.dst = 192.168.1.2 and
tcp.dst = 22) -> .* ],
[z : (ip.src = 192.168.1.1 and
ip.dst = 192.168.1.2 and
!(tcpDst=22|tcpDst=80)) -> .* dpi .*],
max(x, 50MB/s)
and max(y, 25MB/s)
and max(z, 25MB/s)
It gives 50MB/s to HTTP traffic with the constrain that it
passes through a log that monitors all web requests, 25MB/s
to SSH traffic, and 25MB/s to the remaining traffic, which
must flow through a dpi box.
4.2 Verification
Allowing tenants to make arbitrary modifications to poli-
cies would not be safe. For example, a tenant could lift re-
strictions on forwarding paths, eliminate transformations, or
allocate more bandwidth to their own traffic—all violations
of the global policy set down by the administrator. Fortu-
nately, Merlin negotiators can leverage the policy language
representation to check policy inclusion, which can be used
to establish the correctness of policy transformations imple-
mented by untrusted tenants.
Intuitively, a valid refinement of a policy is one that makes
it only more restrictive. To verify that a policy modified by
a tenant is a valid refinement of the original, the negotiator
simply has to check that for every statement in the original
policy, the set of paths allowed for matching packets in the
refined policy is included in the set of paths in the original,
and the bandwidth constraints in the refined policy imply the
bandwidth constraints in the original. These conditions can
be decided using a simple algorithm that performs a pair-
wise comparison of all statements in the original and mod-
ified policies, (i) checking for language inclusion [28] be-
tween the regular expressions in statements with overlapping
predicates, and (ii) checking that the sum of the bandwidth
constraints in all overlapping predicates implies the original
constraint.
4.3 Adaptation
Bandwidth re-allocation does not require recompilation of
the global policy, and can thus happen quite rapidly. As a
proof-of-concept, we implemented negotiators that can pro-
vide both min-max fair sharing and additive-increase, multi-
plicative decrease allocation schemes. These negotiators al-
low traffic policies to change with dynamic workloads, while
still obeying the overall static global policies. Changes in
path constraints require global recompilation and updating
forwarding rules on the switches, so they incur a greater
overhead. However, we believe these changes are likely to
occur less frequently than changes to bandwidth allocations.
5. IMPLEMENTATION
We have implemented a full working prototype of the Mer-
lin system in OCaml and C. Our implementation uses the
Gurobi Optimizer [25] to solve constraints, the Frenetic con-
troller [20] to install forwarding rules on OpenFlow switches,
the Click router [38] to manage software middleboxes, and
the ipfilters and tc utilities on Linux end hosts. Note that
the design of Merlin does not depend on these specific sys-
tems. It would be easy to instantiate our design with other
systems, and our implementation provides a clean interface
for incorporating additional backends.
Our implementation of Merlin negotiator and verification
mechanisms leverages standard algorithms for transforming
and analyzing predicates and regular expressions. To del-
egate a policy, Merlin simply intersects the predicates and
regular expressions in each statement the original policy to
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Figure 4: Merlin expressiveness, measured using policies
for the Stanford campus network topology.
project out the policy for the sub-network. To verify implica-
tions between policies, Merlin uses the Z3 SMT solver [48]
to check predicate disjointness, and the Dprle library [27] to
check inclusions between regular expressions.
6. EVALUATION
To evaluate Merlin, we investigated three main issues: (i)
the expressiveness of the Merlin policy language, (ii) the
ability of Merlin to improve end-to-end performance for ap-
plications, and (iii) the scalability of the compiler and nego-
tiator components with respect to network and policy size.
We used two testbeds in our evaluation. Most experiments
were run on a cluster of Dell r720 PowerEdge servers with
two 8-core 2.7GHz Intel Xeon processors, 32GB RAM, and
four 1GB NICs. The Ring Paxos experiment (§6.2) was con-
ducted on a cluster of eight HP SE1102 servers equipped
with two quad-core Intel Xeon L5420 processors running at
2.5 GHz, with 8 GB of RAM and two 1GB NICs. Both
clusters used a Pica8 Pronto 3290 switch to connect the ma-
chines. To test the scalability we ran the compiler and nego-
tiator frameworks on various topologies and policies.
Overall, our experimental evaluation shows that Merlin
can quickly provision and configure real-world datacenter
and enterprise networks, that Merlin can be used to obtain
better performance for big-data processing applications and
replication systems, and that Merlin allows administrators to
succinctly express network policies.
6.1 Expressiveness.
To explore the expressiveness of the Merlin policy lan-
guages, we built several network policies for the 16-node
Stanford core campus network topology [3]. We created 24
subnets and then implemented a series of policies in Merlin,
and compared the sizes of the Merlin source policies and the
outputs generated by the compiler. This comparison mea-
sures the degree to which Merlin is able to abstract away
from hardware-level details and provide effective constructs
for managing a real-world network.
The Merlin policies we implemented are as follows:
1. All-pairs connectivity. This policy implements basic
forwarding between all pairs of hosts and provides a
baseline measurement of the number of low-level in-
structions that would be needed in almost any non-
trivial application. The Merlin policy is only 6 lines
long and compiles to 145 OpenFlow rules.
2. Bandwidth caps and guarantee. This policy augments
the basic connectivity by providing 10% of traffic classes
a bandwidth guarantee of 1Mbps and a cap of 1Gbps.
Such a guarantee would be useful, for example, to pri-
oritize emergency messages sent to students. This pol-
icy required 11 lines of Merlin code, but generates over
1600 OpenFlow rules, 90 TC rules and 248 queue con-
figurations. The number of OpenFlow rules increased
dramatically due to the presence of the bandwidth guar-
antees which required provisioning separate forward-
ing paths for a large collection of traffic classes.
3. Firewall. This policy assumes the presence of a mid-
dlebox that filters incoming web traffic connected to
the network ingress switches. The baseline policy is
altered to forward all packets matching a particular pat-
tern (e.g., tcp.dst = 80) through the middlebox. This
policy requires 23 lines of Merlin code, but generates
over 500 OpenFlow instructions.
4. Monitoring middlebox. This policy attaches middle-
boxes to two switches and partitions the hosts into two
sets of roughly equal size. Hosts connected to switches
in the same set may send traffic to each other directly,
but traffic flowing between sets must be passed through
a middlebox. This policy is useful for filtering traffic
from untrusted sources, such as student dorms. This
policy required 11 lines of Merlin code but generates
300 OpenFlow rules, roughly double the baseline num-
ber.
5. Combination. This policy augments the basic connec-
tivity with a filter for web traffic, a bandwidth guar-
antee for certain traffic classes and an inspection pol-
icy for a certain class of hosts. This policy requires 23
lines of Merlin code, but generates over 3000 low-level
instructions.
The results of this experiment are depicted in Figure 4.
Overall, it shows that using Merlin significantly reduces the
effort, in terms of lines of code, required to provision and
configure network devices for a variety of real-world man-
agement tasks.
6.2 Application Performance
Our second experiment measured Merlin’s ability to im-
prove end-to-end performance for real-world applications.
Hadoop. Hadoop is a popular open-source MapReduce [13]
implementation, and is widely-used for data analytics. A
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Figure 5: Ring-Paxos (a) without and (b) with Merlin.
Hadoop computation proceeds in three stages: the system
(i) applies a map operator to each data item to produce a
large set of key-value pairs; (ii) shuffles all data with a given
key to a single node; and (iii) applies the reduce operator to
values with the same key. The many-to-many communica-
tion pattern used in the shuffle phase often results in heavy
network load, making Hadoop jobs especially sensitive to
background traffic. In practice, this background traffic can
come from a variety of sources. For example, some appli-
cations use UDP-based gossip protocols to update state, such
as system monitoring tools [63, 62], network overlay man-
agement [32], and even distributed storage systems [63, 14].
A sensible network policy would be to provide guaranteed
bandwidth to Hadoop jobs so that they finish expediently,
and give the UDP traffic only best-effort guarantees.
With Merlin, we implemented this policy using just three
policy statements. To show the impact of the policy, we ran
a Hadoop job that sorts 10GB of data, and measured the time
to complete it on a cluster of four servers, under three differ-
ent configurations:
1. Baseline. Hadoop had exclusive access to the network.
2. Interference. we used the iperf tool to inject UDP
packets, simulating background traffic.
3. Guarantees. we again injected background traffic, but
guaranteed 90 percent of the capacity for Hadoop.
The measurements demonstrate the expected results. With
exclusive network access, the Hadoop job finished in 466
seconds. With background traffic causing network conges-
tion, the job finished in 558 seconds, a roughly 20% slow
down. With the Merlin policy providing bandwidth guaran-
tees, the job finished in 500 seconds, corresponding to the
90% allocation of bandwidth.
Ring-Paxos. State-machine replication (SMR) is a funda-
mental approach to designing fault-tolerant services [41, 56]
at the core of many current systems (e.g., Googles Chubby [7],
Scatter [23], Spanner [12]). State machine replication pro-
vides clients with the abstraction of a highly available ser-
vice by replicating the servers and regulating how commands
are propagated to and executed by the replicas: (i) every non-
faulty replica must receive all commands in the same order;
and (ii) the execution of commands must be deterministic.
Because ordering commands in a distributed setting is a
non-negligible operation, the performance of a replicated
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Figure 6: Compilation times for Internet Topology Zoo.
service is often determined by the number of commands that
can be ordered per time unit. To achieve high performance,
the service state can be partitioned and each partition repli-
cated individually (e.g., by separating data from meta-data),
but the partitions will compete for shared resources (e.g.,
common nodes and network links).
We assessed the performance of a key-value store ser-
vice replicated with state-machine replication. Commands
are ordered using an open-source implementation of Ring
Paxos [44], a highly efficient implementation of the Paxos
protocol [42]. We deployed two instances of the service,
each one using four processes. One process in each service
is co-located on the same machine and all other processes
run on different machines. Clients are distributed across six
different machines and submit their requests to one of the
services and receive responses from the replicas.
Figure 5 (a) depicts the throughput of the two services; the
aggregate throughput shows the accumulated performance
of the two services. Since both services compete for re-
sources on the common machine, each service has a sim-
ilar share of the network, the bottlenecked resource at the
common machine. In Figure 5 (b), we provide a bandwidth
guarantee for Service 2. Note that this guarantee does not
come at the expense of utilization. If Service 2 stops send-
ing traffic, Service 1 is free to use the available bandwidth.
Summary. Overall, these experiments show that Merlin poli-
cies can concisely express real-world policies, and that the
Merlin system is able to generate code that achieves the de-
sired outcomes for applications on real hardware.
6.3 Compilation and Verification
The scalability of the Merlin compiler and verification
framework depend on both the size of the network topology
and the number of traffic classes. Our third experiment eval-
uates the scalability of Merlin under a variety of scenarios.
Compiler. We first measured the compilation time needed
by Merlin to provide pair-wise connectivity between all hosts
in a topology. This task, which could be computed offline,
has been used to evaluate other systems, including VMware’s
NSX, which reports approximately 30 minutes to achieve
100% connectivity from a cold boot [40]. We used the Inter-
net Topology Zoo [29] dataset, which contains 262 topolo-
gies that represent a large diversity of network structures.
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Traffic Classes Hosts Switches LP construction (ms) LP solution (ms) Rateless solution (ms)
870 30 45 25 22 33
8010 90 80 214 160 36
28730 170 125 364 252 106
39800 200 125 1465 1485 91
95790 310 180 13287 248779 222
136530 370 180 27646 1200912 215
159600 400 180 29701 1351865 212
229920 480 245 86678 10476008 451
Figure 7: Number of traffic classes, topology sizes, and solution times for fat tree topologies with 5% of the traffic
classes with guaranteed bandwidth.
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Figure 8: Compilation times for an increasing number of traffic classes for (a) all pairs connectivity on a balanced tree,
(b) 5% of the traffic with guaranteed priority on a balanced tree, (c) all pairs connectivity on a fat tree, (d) 5% of the
traffic with guaranteed priority on a fat tree.
The topologies have average size of 40 switches, with a stan-
dard deviation of 30 switches. The Merlin compiler takes
less than 50ms to provide connectivity for the majority of
topologies, and less than 600ms to provide connectivity for
all but one of the topologies. Figure 6 shows the results
for 261 of the topologies. To improve the readability of
the graph, we elided the largest topology, which has 754
switches and took Merlin 4 seconds to compile.
To explore the scalability with bandwidth guarantees, we
measured the compilation time on two types of tree topolo-
gies, balanced and fat trees, for an increasing number of
traffic classes. Each traffic class represents a unidirectional
stream going from one host at the edge of the network to
another. Thus, the total number of classes correspond to the
number of point-to-point traffic flows. Table 7 shows a sam-
ple of topology sizes and solution times for various traffic
classes for fat tree topologies. For both types of topolo-
gies, we took two sets of measurements: the time to provide
pair-wise connectivity with no guarantees, and the time to
provide connectivity when 5% of the traffic classes receive
guarantees. Figure 8 shows the results. As expected, provid-
ing bandwidth guarantees adds overhead to the compilation
time. For the worst case scenario that we measured, on a
network with 400, 000 total traffic classes, with 20, 000 of
those classes receiving bandwidth guarantees, Merlin took
around 41 minutes to find a solution. To put that number
in perspective, B4 [31] only distinguishes 13 traffic classes.
Merlin finds solutions for 100 traffic classes with guarantees
in a network with 125 switches in less than 5 seconds.
These experiments show that Merlin can provide connec-
tivity for large networks quickly and our mixed-integer pro-
gramming approach used for guaranteeing bandwidth scales
to large networks with reasonable overhead.
Verifying negotiators. Delegated Merlin policies can be
modified by negotiators in three ways: by changing the pred-
icates, the regular expressions, or the bandwidth allocations.
We ran three experiments to benchmark our negotiator ver-
ification runtime for these cases. First, we increased the
number of additional predicates generated in the delegated
policy. Second, we increased the complexity of the regular
expressions in the delegated policy. The number of nodes in
the regular expression’s abstract syntax tree is used as a mea-
sure of its complexity. Finally, we increased the number of
bandwidth allocations in the delegated policy. For all three
experiments, we measured the time needed for negotiators
to verify a delegated policy against the original policy. We
report the mean and standard deviation over ten runs.
The results, shown in Figure 9, demonstrate that policy
verification is extremely fast for increasing predicates and
allocations. Both scale linearly up to tens of thousands of al-
locations and statements and complete in milliseconds. This
shows that Merlin negotiators can be used to rapidly adjust
to changing traffic loads. Verification of regular expressions
has higher overhead. It scales quadratically, and takes about
3.5 seconds for an expression with a thousand nodes in its
parse tree. However, since regular expressions denote paths
through the network, it is unlikely that we will encounter
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Figure 9: Time taken to verify a delegated policy for an increasing number of delegated predicates, increasingly complex
regular expressions, and an increasing number of bandwidth allocations.
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Figure 10: (a) AIMD and (b) MMFS dynamic adapta-
tion.
regular expressions with thousands of nodes in realistic de-
ployments. Moreover, we expect path constraints to change
relatively infrequently compared to bandwidth constraints.
Dynamic adaptation. Merlin negotiators support a wide
range of resource management schemes. We implemented
two common approaches: additive-increase, multiplicative
decrease (AIMD), and max-min fair-sharing (MMFS). With
AIMD, tenants adjust resource demands by incrementally
trying to increasing their allocation. With MMFS, tenants
declare resource requirements ahead of time. The negotia-
tor attempts to satisfy demands starting with the smallest.
Remaining bandwidth is distributed among all tenants. Fig-
ure 10 (a) shows the bandwidth usage over time for two hosts
using the AIMD strategy. Figure 10 (b) shows the bandwidth
usage over time for four hosts using the MMFS negotiators.
Host h1 communicates with h2, and h3 communicates with
h4. Both graphs were generated using our hardware testbed.
Overall, the negotiators allow the network to quickly adapt
to changing resource demands, while respecting the global
constraints imposed by the policy.
7. RELATED WORK
In prior work [61], we presented a preliminary design for
Merlin including sketching the encoding of path selection
as a constraint problem, and presenting ideas for language-
based delegation and verification. This paper expands our
eariler work with a complete description of Merlin’s design
and implementation and an experimental evaluation.
A number of systems in recent years have investigated
mechanisms for providing bandwidth caps and guarantees [4,
59, 52, 33], implementing traffic filters [30, 55], or specify-
ing forwarding policies at different points in the network [19,
24, 46, 26]. Merlin builds on these approaches by providing
a unified interface and central point of control for switches,
middleboxes, and end hosts.
SIMPLE [54] is a framework for controlling middleboxes.
SIMPLE attempts to load balance the network with respect to
TCAM and CPU usage. Like Merlin, it solves an optimization
problem, but it does not specify the programming interface
to the framework, or how policies are represented and an-
alyzed. APLOMB [58] is a system that allows middleboxes
to be obtained from a cloud service. Merlin is designed to
provide a programming abstraction for the whole network,
of which a middlebox is just one kind of network element. It
would be interesting to extend Merlin with a back-end that
supports cloud-hosted middleboxes as in APLOMB.
Many different programming languages have been pro-
posed in recent years including Frenetic [19], Pyretic [47],
and Maple [64]. These languages typically offer abstractions
for programming OpenFlow networks. However, these lan-
guages are limited in that they do not allow programmers
to specify middlebox functionality, allocate bandwidth, or
delegate policies. An exception is the PANE [18] system,
which allows end hosts to make explicit requests for net-
work resources like bandwidth. Unlike Merlin, PANE does
not provide mechanisms for partitioning functionality across
a variety of devices and delegation is supported at the level
of individual network flows, rather than entire policies.
The Merlin compiler implements a form of program parti-
tioning. This idea has been previously used in other domains
including secure web applications [10], and distributed com-
puting and storage [43].
8. CONCLUSION
The success of programmable network platforms has demon-
strated the benefits of high-level languages for managing
networks. Merlin complements these approaches by further
raising the level of abstraction. Merlin allows administra-
tors to specify the functionality of an entire network, leaving
the low-level configuration of individual components to the
compiler. At the same time, Merlin provides tenants with the
freedom to tailor policies to their particular needs, while as-
11
suring administrators that the global constraints are correctly
enforced. Overall, this approach significantly simplifies net-
work administration, and lays a solid foundation for a wide
variety of future research on network programmability.
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